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ABSTRACT
Authentication and authorization to online sites is a difficult problem to solve without the use
of cryptography. The standard method of using passwords is clearly an insecure method of
authentication. A method of authenticating users utilizing a Latin square was developed by a
security enthusiast and touted as secure. This paper demonstrates a novel method of cracking
the Latin squares that are used to generate the secure passwords in the Off The Grid (OTG)
password management scheme. Our method leverages the cores on Graphics Processing Unit
(GPU) using the Compute Unified Device Architecture (CUDA) programming extension to
efficiently solve the Latin squares used in the OTG password management solution. We
developed a model that represents the possible states and the constraints of the OTG system.
We show that the OTG system leaks information about its Latin square and we provide
supporting evidence through examples and computation.
Keywords: Parallel Computing, Passwords, Latin Squares, GPU, CUDA, Authentication,
Access Control, Cloud Security

1.

INTRODUCTION

The use of passwords has become a typical
method of authentication for users of digital systems for the past 30 years. This use
was spawned out of the original Unix systems, where users shared the resources of a
multi-user system. During the rise of the Internet, these password-based systems were
thrust upon users of websites. Users were
either given an easy to remember password
or they were allowed to choose their own
password for authentication. Websites are
then responsible for storing the secret password that user will use to authenticate to
c 2019 ADFSL

the server. In the early days, websites would
store the password in plain text and simply
compare the password on the server with the
password that the user entered when authenticating.
Attackers have had the ability to gain
unauthorized access to Internet connected
computer systems as long as computers have
been connected to the network. When an
attacker gains access to a website that has
passwords stored in plain text, then that attacker can then easily authenticate as any
user of the system. The loss of a single password from a single website should not give
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the attacker access to a different website,
except when the user uses the same password for both sites. With the growth in the
number of websites that are used for normal
day-to-day activities, users do not maintain
a unique password for every site.
To thwart password re-use attacks, website maintainers have migrated from storing plaintext passwords to storing hashes of
passwords. When a user selects a new password, the website will hash the password using one of the secure hashing algorithms, like
MD5, SHA256 or SHA512. When the user
authenticates at a later time, the website
will compute the hash of the given password
with the hash that is stored in the database.
If they match, it is highly likely that the
user has the correct password. If an attacker
can exfiltrate the database of passwords then
they can try and crack those passwords offline. Cracking a hashed password means
that the attacker will have to guess the password. They can either use brute force, and
guess every possible password of a specific
length, or they can use rules based on human
behavior to guess passwords. Either method
increases the difficulty for the attacker to be
able to take a password from one website and
use it on a different website.
In the creation of public key cryptography has raised the bar for authenticating
users (SSH Communications Security, 2018).
Users can generate and save a public/private key pair for authentication purposes.
They can then store and share a public key
on a server. If the security of the server
is compromised, then no secret information is lost. This method of authentication
is extremely difficult to attack, compared
to attacking password based authentication
methods used by typical websites.
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)
is a standards body that creates standards
for the Internet and websites. They have
created standards for Web commerce, Web
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Payments and the Web Of Things(W3C,
2019). The W3C has defined the WebAuthn standard(W3C, 2018) for allowing access
to hardware devices from Internet websites.
These hardware devices provide the ability
for a user to authenticate with a website,
without sharing private information to the
website. The YubiKey(YubiKey, 2018) is an
example of a hardware device that can be
accessible to websites through the WebAuthN standard. The YubiKey has the ability
to use the FIDO2 protocol(Alliance, 2018)
to authenticate website users. With FIDO2,
a device can generate a random asymmetric public/private key pair. The device can
then provide the public key as a method of
authentication for the user. The device has
the ability to prove that the user possesses
the private key, without exposing the private key to the website. Thus, the website
does not have any secrets to store. The same
public key can be used for multiple websites,
without exposing a sensitive key to multiple
parties.
During the past two decades, attackers
and computer scientists have been leveraging the GPU to do more than processing graphics. The parallel nature of rendering graphics has lead to a vast increase in the number of cores on a graphics card. In 2009 graphics cards had 8
cores and by 2017 a high end graphics card
has nearly 4000 cores(Wikipedia, 2018a)
(Galloy, 2018). Figure 1 shows the vast increase in GPU cores over the past decade.
This vast increase in computing power by
graphics cards has lead to their use for
other purposes.
Such examples include
the solving of compute intensive parallelizable tasks, such as the simulation of biochemical molecules(NVIDIA, 2018-05), machine learning (NVIDIA, 2018-04) and the
cracking of password hashes. The Hashcat program (Hashcat, 2018-05) is a password cracking program that can utilize eic 2019 ADFSL
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ther a CPU and/or a GPU to crack password
hashes. Hashcat has the ability to use either
Nvidi.iCoresby'lear

Figure 1. GPU Cores by Year
brute force attacks, dictionary attacks or a
combination of the the two. If an attacker
has the ability to acquire a password hash
stored on a website, then they can attempt
to crack that password. There are two standard methods that a website can use to hash
a password. The first is to run the password
through a secure hashing algorithm. Then
when the website attempts to authenticate
the user, it will hash the password provided
by the user and see if the hashes match. The
problem with this method, is that if multiple users use the same password, then their
passwords hashes will be exactly the same.
Thus the attacker will only need to attack
each hash once for all the users. To make attacks harder, websites are encouraged to salt
their passwords. With salted hashes, each
user of a website has a unique salt stored on
the website(Wikipedia, 2108). The website
then concatenates the salt with the password
and then hashes the concatenated string and
stores the salted hash. The stored salted
hash will be different for every user, even
if those users have the same password (each
user has a unique salt). Thus, the attacker
will have to attack each salted hash, which
will more difficult than attacking unsalted
password hashes.
c 2019 ADFSL
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2.

BACKGROUND

The OTG password scheme was developed
by Steve Gibson of Gibson Research Corporation (GRC). The description of the system
is located on its project page(Gibson, 2018).
He has designed security systems such as the
Shields Up port scanner, a Spectre and Meltdown detector and a DNS benchmark tool.
The OTG system is designed to be printed
onto paper and then used off line(thus the
name).
The OTG password system works by generating a 26x26 Latin Square. A Latin
Square is a N xN matrix where every row
and every column have exactly one value
from 1 to N. The popular Sudoku puzzles
are a more restrictive instance of a Latin
square. The OTG password system generates a 26x26 Latin square where every cell
contains a single letter of the alphabet. Every OTG square generated by the GRC website is randomly generated. An OTG user
will then print their unique square for use
in generating passwords. The OTG website
provides directions for the users to use the
OTG algorithm, which we will briefly describe below.

2.1

Off The Grid Usage

After the user has created and printed a
grid, they are ready to start generating passwords for websites. The first step is to trace
through the grid to locate your starting location. Figure 2 shows an illustration of
tracing the amazon.com domain through the
grid. The user locates the “A” (first letter
of Amazon) in the very top row of the grid.
They then locate the next letter of the domain “m” and find its location in the same
column as the beginning “A” was located.
The next letter is Amazon is an “a”. The
user switches directions and moves horizontally in the same row as the “m” to locate the
next “a” in that row. This process continues
Page 3
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until the user has traced through the entire
domain. We will call this location where the
user finishes tracing the domain the starting point. The starting point is then used
to generate the password for the website at
that domain.
amazon

In this example the password for Amazon is
“gcznegmacmzg”.

M
~

l~

c1 :-1

a

Figure 3. Generating a password

2.2
Figure 2. Tracing through the grid
After the user has located the starting
point they then trace through the grid to
generate the password. An interesting note,
is that the starting location is the last letter
of the domain name. The user then locates
the starting letter in the domain name. In
our example, the user ended at the “n” in
Amazon and now they will locate the starting “A” in the same row. This example is
illustrated in Figure 3. After the user has
located the “A” in that row the first 2 characters of the password are generated. In this
example the “A” is followed by a “gc”. The
OTG system defines that first to letters of
the users password are now “gc”. The user
then continues tracking the domain, starting
at the ending letter of “c” and they switch
from moving horizontally to moving vertically. They then locate the next letter in
the domain which in this case is the “m” in
Amazon. The next two letters of the password are the two letters that follow the “m”
in in that column, which is “nz” in this example. This process continues until the user
has traced through the entire domain name.
Page 4

Special Cases

There are a few special cases that occur in
the OTG system. Case 1 is when tracing
the grid, the user can reach a letter that is
at the edge of the grid. The user then can
use the “overshoot” method to wrap around
the grid. Figure 4 shows how the generation of a password can wrap around the the
grid. Case 2 is when the domain has two
consecutive letters in a row (aka Facebook).
The OTG website does not specify how to
handle this case, but for this case we assume
that the user generates two letters to either
side of the letters in the same row or column
(depending on the current direction of the
trace).
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Figure 4. Wrapping Case
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3.

ATTACKING GRIDS

When attacking the OTG system we assume
that there are websites that have OTG passwords leaked. The OTG author assumes
that if the passwords to a set of websites
are leaked, then the security of other websites will not be affected. Our assumption
is that there exists a set of passwords that
are leaked. In particular, we will have a pair
of inputs, the leaked websites domain name
and the leaked password, we coin this information a Domain Name Password (DNP)
pair.
The simplest method to attack the OTG
would be to try and generate all possible
Latin squares. But as the OTG website
states, there are 9.337 x 10426 possible Latin
squares. This type of attack would be infeasible to use. Thus a more targeted approach
is needed, if this system can be attacked.

Figure 5. Example password Generation
We started with the information that we
can glean from the password generation algorithm. We will assume that we are starting
with a single users Latin square. In Figure
5 we can see that when a user generates a
password using the domain name, the last
letter of the domain is followed by the first
letter of the domain name. Additionally, we
know that the first two letters of the password immediately follow the first letter of
the domain name. Figure 6 shows the restrictions on the passwords that are generated. To indicate the restrictions on a Latin
square the arrow notation will be used. if
A → BCD is shown, that will mean that A
is followed by zero or more characters in a
row and the symbols BCD will be consecutive in the users Latin square. Consecutive
characters will adhere to the wrap around efc 2019 ADFSL
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fect mentioned in Section 2.2 and thus BCD
are logically consecutive. In the example in
Figure 5 we know that N → AGC is a restriction on all valid Latin squares that could
generate the password for this domain name.
Domain Name

Password

a~

negmacmzg

Figure 6. Latin Square Restrictions
A second example that restricts the number of Latin square is in the wrap around
effect that can occur (Section 2.2). It is possible both letters from the domain name to
be on the edge of the grid. If this is the
case, then the wrap around will include the
original letter in the domain name. Figure
7 will illustrate this issue. Suppose the we
are starting in column 1 on the letter “A”.
The next letter in the domain is the “M”
which is in column N (or the last column of
a NxN grid). Due to the wrap around rule
the restriction generated will be A → M AB
and thus we know that A and M are on the
border of the grid. This restriction severally
limits the number of possible grids that can
create this domain name password combination. In this example there are only 2 possible locations for the letter A and M (in that
row). There can also exist the combination
of A → M BA, where the starting domain
letter is the last letter in the restriction. In
this case there are 4 possible locations for
the restriction to be located.
Column

N

Row

Figure 7. Wrap Around Condition
In addition to the restrictions above we
also can glean information from the chain
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of restrictions. Each step in the generation
of the password will leak information about
the set of possible Latin squares. In Figure 3 we have the restriction of N → AGC.
We also know that the column of the letter
“C” is the starting point for the restriction
C → M ZN . This process repeats for the
entire chain of the password. Additionally,
we observed that domain names that contain
an even number of characters, will initially
start generating passwords where the user is
moving horizontally through the grid. If the
domain name has an odd number of characters, then the user will start by moving
vertically through the grid to generate passwords.

3.1

Testing Model

Our approach is to start with Latin squares
of a size where there is a known exact number of Latin squares possible. For our tests,
we started by using Latin squares of size
10. To represent domains and passwords
the letters A-J will be used. For a 10x10
Latin square there are 9.98 x 1036 possible
total squares(Wikipedia, 2018b). We chose
a random Latin square to use as the base for
which to generate passwords from (known as
grid0). After the initial Latin square was
generated, a set of random domain names
was created. For each of the domain names
the process described in Section 2.1 was used
to generate the password for that domain using grid0. The domain name and password
pairs are stored in a plain text file. For this
project we generated a random set of 12,288
DNP pairs.

4.

LEVERAGING
CUDA

The original solutions to solve this problem were written using multi-threading in
the Java language. Java is a compiled language, but the speed of operation for a Java
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program is significantly slower than running
the same program in the C language. Additionally , typical computing systems have
between 4 and 24 different cores that can
run in parallel. Due to these limitations, the
prior implementations were not very efficient
at solving the Latin squares.
With the prolific rise in the number of
cores that can be integrated onto a single
GPU the design of the project focused on
designing a system that would be able to
leverage a high number of cores. The current
design requires at least 840 cores for the initial phase, but this number is configurable.
This number is based off of the number of
possible grids that are generated by a single brute force attack on a 10 x 10 Latin
square. Additionally we focused on developing a CUDA based application, which runs
on an Nvidia graphics card. CUDA is an extension of the C programming language that
allows a developer to write classic C code,
with the ability to write code that runs on
a GPU. CUDA allows the programmer to
define code that is run on the host machine
(CPU) and on the device GPU. There is an
interface provided by CUDA that allows host
code to interact with the device. CUDA also
provides a mapping between RAM and the
device memory. This allows the host and the
device to seamlessly synchronize and transfer data. The CUDA drivers take care of the
actual copying of data over the bus that connect the host machine to the graphics device.

4.1

CUDA Implementation
Issues

CUDA has the advantage of having a vast
number of raw cores that can be leveraged
by an application. This does come at the
cost of having a much lower amount RAM
that can be accessed by the graphics card.
Typical cards have the ability to address between 4 and 8 gigabytes of RAM. This is conc 2019 ADFSL
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trast to the fact that CPU’s can access to an
excess of 128 gigabytes of RAM. The initial
designs of the CUDA software were designed
recursively. The depth of the recursion was
only a few hundred calls deep, but this type
of design would crash the CUDA software.
The design was then switched to maintain
the state in RAM. The RAM is maintaining
by using the CUDA Unified Memory Model.
This model allows the programmer to allocate memory in both host and device levels, and then synchronization is implemented
by the compiler and provided by the CUDA
driver software.
The implementation of the system also
had to take into account that a minimal
amount of state could be saved between.
The limited amount of RAM available to the
GPU forced a depth first approach to solving
the Latin squares. The state was stored for
all the previous computations as if the system were implemented recursively, but without the overhead of calling functions.

4.2

Implementation Details

The starting point of the software was to
read in the domain name and the password
associated with that domain name. This
data was then converted from text to a
linked list data structure shown in Listing
1. This structure holds a single restriction
A → BCD in a compact form. The integer
representation of the characters are stored
in the letters array. The direction character
stores if the restriction is either a horizontal
restriction or vertical restriction. The P ath
structure is a linked list, where each restriction points to either the next restriction, or
points to N U LL if it is last last one in the
list. This data structure is created one time
during the reading of the DNP pairs from
the file.
Listing 1. Path Structure
typedef struct Path
c 2019 ADFSL
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{
struct Path ∗ next ;
char d i r e c t i o n ;
int l e t t e r s [ 4 ] ;
char ∗ domain ;
char ∗ p a s s ;
} Path ;
The grid structure stores the information
about the state of the grid, given the path
restrictions. It is shown in Listing 2. The
grid maintains a N x N array of characters
that represent the ASCII character that is
at the current location. If the character is
unknown, then a sentinel dash character () is stored in cell. This allows the grid to
be printed to the console in a easy to read
format. The ok variable stores the result of
if the grid has any errors, when trying to
set a character at a particular location. The
error occurs when either 1) there is already
a different character in that location or 2)
that character is already in the current row
or column. This can occur for any of the 3
characters when a path is being traced.
One of the major optimizations that occurred when developing this implementation
was the use of bit vectors to store the information about the letters in the rows and
columns. For example suppose that the program decides that a “C” should set in Row 1,
Column 7. A simple implementation would
store the fact that “C” could not be in any
cell in Row 1, as well as any Cell in Column
7. For a N xN grid, this would require either a list in every cell N elements for N xN
cells or it would require a bit vector for every cell N xN . These solutions either take up
a relatively large amount of space (on the
space limited GPU) or time to go through
every row and column to check the restrictions. The optimized solution was to use
a single bit vector for every row and every
column. This required 2N amount of storage for a N xN grid. If the system tries “C”
Page 7
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should set in Row 1, Column 7, then “C” is
removed from the Row 1 bit vector and the
Column 7 bit vector. Each letter is represented by using a bit mask where each letter
is 2N where N is the ordinal value of the letter in the alphabet. Thus A is 20 = 1, B
is 21 = 2 and C is 22 = 4 and so on and
so forth. As the maximum size for a Latin
square in the OTG system has 26 cells, a single 32 bit integer can be used to store the bit
vector. This representation allows system to
set the restrictions in O(2) time and it uses
O(2N) space to store these restrictions. The
implementation uses bitwise or to add a new
restriction and bitwise and to check for the
existence of a restriction. These restrictions
are stored in the grid using the row and col
fields of the grid structure.
Listing 2. Grid Structure
typedef struct Grid
{
int ∗row ;
int ∗ c o l ;
char ∗∗ C e l l s ;
char ok ;
} Grid ;
The location data structure is used to
store information about where the system is
guessing a restriction will go within a grid.
This data structure is shown in Listing 3.
The x and y variables are used to store where
the first letter in a restriction is supposed to
be located. In the example A → BCD the
letter “A” is located at (x,y) within the grid.
The type field in the location structure can
either be Full or Partial. A Full search type
is used to go through every combination of x
and y coordinates. This is used for the first
restriction within a path. The Full search
type is used to generate the primer for the
grids. A full search on a 10x10 grid, that
does not have any special case restrictions,
generates 840 possible grids. Each of these
Page 8
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grids is then distributed to a different core
on the GPU during subsequent calls. The
rest of the restrictions of the path will all be
be partial locations. A full is also used when
the next DNP pair is searched.
For both the Full and Partial, the system
uses the direction in the path (Listing 1) to
determine how nextX and nextY are incremented. For the Partial path, if the restriction in horizontal, then nextY and y will
remain constant through the loop and the
nextX value will increment through the loop
from index 1 to N .
Listing 3. Location Structure
typedef struct L o c a t i o n
{
uint8 t x ;
uint8 t y ;
u i n t 8 t nextX ;
u i n t 8 t nextY ;
uint8 t lastX ;
uint8 t lastY ;
u i n t 8 t type ;
u i n t 8 t edge ;
} Location ;
The Location data structure tracks the
current location and the system then increments the current location until it has gone
through all possible locations. If the system were written recursively, then the state
would be kept track of by the recursive calls,
but it had to be done manually. The State
structure was used to store the state information. It keeps track of the current Grid,
P ath and Location. Additionally, the state
keeps track of the information about the total number of iterations and the number of
valid grids that occurred during those iterations. This statistical information helps researchers to understand the complexity and
the runtime of the system, when cracking
Latin squares.
Listing 4. State Structure
c 2019 ADFSL
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typedef struct S t a t e {
Grid g r i d ;
Location l o c a t i o n ;
Path ∗ path ;
long count ;
long i t e r a t i o n s ;
} State ;
The State structure had to be created to
accommodate the problem of recursion in
CUDA on the GPU. The developer implemented a State structure for every depth of
the search, such that backtracking to previous states could be accomplished. Every
time a valid grid was encountered, the system saves the current state, and then clones
the entire state to the next depth. The algorithm then increments the state and performs a check to see if the current state can
be incremented. If it cannot be incremented,
the algorithm then pops states until it finds
one that can be incremented. If there are
none, then the algorithm has finished its
search.

5.

METHODOLOGY

The hypothesis of this research was that the
OTG system leaked information with every
password generated. To prove this hypothesis, we first needed to create a Latin square
and a set of DNP pairs. If the OTG system leaked information, then we should see
a lower number of possible grids that would
need to be checked, compared to a brute attack on all possible Latin squares.
The process we used to test the Off The
Grid system was to generate a randomly generated Latin square of size 10. A program
was developed that would chose a random
set of characters to represent a domain name
(repeat letters were omitted). For each domain name, the algorithm would locate the
starting point, by tracing the path of the
c 2019 ADFSL
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domain name in the Latin square as described in Section 2.1. The algorithm would
then generate the password for each domain.
The output of this program was the 12,288
unique DNP pairs.
After the DNP pairs were generated, the
testing of the system could begin. Many
shell scripts were created to automate the
task of extracting a particular DNP pair and
then attacking it with the GPU password
cracking system described in Section 4. The
scripts would either 1) run that DNP pair
through the password cracking system or 2)
combine multiple DNP pairs and run them
through the password cracking system.
The password cracking system would generate a small amount of log information as
it ran. It would time how long the process took, generate statistical information
and it could even verify that the original
grid was located at each depth of the search.
The statistical information collected would
count the number of possible grids that were
searched as well as the number of valid grids
at each depth. The verification that the original grid was optional and it did not positively influence the algorithms performance
at any point.
For the tests that were run we used the
NVIDIA GeForce GTX 970 graphics cards.
A server was built using 4 graphics cards
connected via PCI. These cards fit in a 2U
server chassis, though further research shows
that 8 or more cards can be connected by using USB-to-PCIE convertors. The password
cracking system is designed to use one graphics card at a time, though multiple instances
of the program can be run at the same time.

5.1

Single domain password

To verify that the password cracking system
was working correctly, all of the 12,288 DNP
pairs were run through the system. Figure 8 shows the number of possible grids
generated by each DNP pair. The smallest
Page 9
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number of possible combinations was 8 and
the maximum was just less then 13 million.
The testing at this stage was to run all the
grids through the cracking system. The data
clearly shows a wide amount of variance between the number of possibility generated by
a DNP pair. One property of a Latin Square
is that you can rotate the square 90◦ and the
properties of the square remain. Thus, only
1/4 of the grids are a result of the original
square. Thus, the smallest possible number
of grids that can be generated is 4. A result
of 8 shows that there are two possible grids
(each rotated 4 times).

Cracking the Off The Grid password solution
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Figure 9. 1 password, Percentage of Grid
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Figure 8. 1 password, Number of Possible
Grids
Figure 9 shows another view of the data
generated for all 12,288 DNP. The filled portion of the grids ranged from 11 to 19 percent
with 1 domain name password combination.
For a six character password, more than 90%
of the grids (11,104/12,288) yielded 16 character from the final grid while over 51%
(6,292/12,288) of DNP generated 18 or more
characters. This data shows that on average a 6 character password leaks 18 or more
characters of 100 characters in the grid.

5.2

Two domains

The data presented in Section single show
encouraging results. There is data leakage
for each password generated. Given that
Page 10

there are 12,288 passwords generated for the
first stage, it would not be feasible to generate all possible grids pairs in a reasonable
time frame. For example an average grid
#10052 had 3,637,872 possible valid grids
and it took 13.96 seconds to run that single test. When this is multiplied by every
possible grid that we could combine it with,
then the time to run all of these grids would
not be feasible at this time given the current
hardware in our lab. As the goal of this paper is to pinpoint the uppermost bound on
the amount of data leaked by passwords encoded using this scheme, we opted for a more
targeted approach. The grids that produced
the smallest number of grids were combined
together as a set of 2 of DNP pairs.
By combining the smallest grids, the time
required to combine these DNP was minimized. Each grid was combined with all
the other grids in the top 40 (excluding itself). The test generated 1560 (40x39) different sets of 2 grids that were combined,
and then ran through the password cracking
algorithm. The top 40 grids had between
8 and 88 different valid grids and the filled
percentage ranged from 11% to 15%.
Figure 10 shows the results from generating the possible grids for the combination
c 2019 ADFSL
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of two of the top 40 smallest DNP poirs.
The number of valid grids ranged from 4 to
560. As the grids in this test run were much
smaller in size, the number of possible grids
had a much smaller variance than in the first
test.
Number of possible Grids
600

500

400

300

200
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Analysis was done on the top 40 smallest
grids, and the results were intuitive. The
constraints shown in Section 3, especially in
the wrapping situations yielded the smallest grids. It is clear that if there is a wrap
around that occurs, then the resulting password yields a much smaller set of possible
grids than any other password. Thus these
passwords were weak, and they would shrink
down the state space involved. But, the
passwords that were in the top 40 would often combine not just 1 wrap around password, but often 2 or 3 of these in succession.
This would force the number of possible valid
grids to be very small.

100

5.3
Figure 10. 2 passwords, Number of Possible
Grids
Figure 11 shows the percentage of the grid
that is filled in the same data set. The percentage ranged from 13% to 28%. Again, we
can see that data is still being leaked by the
use of the OTG password system. The results of this test were quick and we could see
that running pairs of DNP through the algorithm yielded more information than running a single DNP through the system.
Number of Filled Cells
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Figure 11. 2 password, Percentage of Grid
Filled
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Optimal Selection

The above approach did not yield a set of optimal results. Section 5.1 showed that for every character in a 6 character domain name
we netted 3 characters worth of information
(51% of grids yielded 18 characters or more).
However, in Section 5.2 we saw that the maximum number of characters of information
leaked was 28. This means for the two DNP
pairs, we yielded 2.3 characters worth of information per character in the passwords.
This result is due to the selection of small
grids over optimal grids that would be combined. The optimal set of grids to combine
would be grids that do not contain any overlap with one another. Then each grid would
yield the maximum amount of information
when run through the password cracking algorithm.
To test our theory about selecting the optimal grids, a group of python programs were
written to extract the final grids from the log
information created by the password cracking system. These scripts would get the final
grid’s output and then combine it with the
final output of other 12,287 grids.
Running the python script on pairs of
DNP pairs, the output resulted in over
48,000 combinations that yielded 38 charPage 11
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acters when combined. This result shows
that if these DNP pairs would be combined,
then the for every character in the two domains, we yield 3.166 characters of information leaked. Running one of the optimal
pairs through our algorithm yielded the result in 1.5 days, running on a single graphics
card.
Another python script was created to attempt to combine the results of combining
3 DNP pairs together. The results of the
script were narrowed down to print only the
grids that had more than 55 characters in
the grid. The data shows that more than
13,000 of the combined grids had either 56
or 57 characters filled in with the grid.

5.4

Estimation of Possible
Combined Grids

Following further analysis of the data, it was
found that one could estimate the number of
total grids that the GPU would have to check
for each password combination. To do so,
one would start by parsing the output and
obtaining the total grids checked and number of valid grids for each individual password in the desired combination. The combination of 2 grids (Grid A and Grid B) is
performed by first computing valid grids for
Grid A and then computing all possible grids
that could occur for Grid B. A pessimistic estimate is to compute the valid grids for Grid
A, and then multiplying that by the possible
grids for Grid B. The computation is done
for Grid A -¿ Grid B and then in reverse
Grid B -¿ Grid A. The most accurate estimate is the minimum of the two products.
For example, in Grid #1734, it was computed that there were 80 possible valid grids
after computing a total of 6,688 possible
grids. In Grid #4773 there were 64 total possible valid after computing a total of 86,808
possible grids. When these two grids were
combined, our program computed an estiPage 12
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mate as shown above. The calculation is performed both directions to extract the smallest estimate. For this example, our program
would take (80 ∗ 86, 808) and (64 ∗ 6, 688)
to obtain our two estimations. The calculation of Grid #4773 followed by Grid#1734
(6,688 x 64) gave us the smaller estimation
of 428,032, so we considered it to be the most
accurate estimate for the combination of the
two grids.

Estimating Number of Grid s to Check for 2x2s
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Figure 12

A test of combining Grid #1734 with Grid
#4773 found that it checked an actual total of 162,244 grids. These calculations were
performed on the top 40 smallest grids. Each
top 40 grid was combined with every other
top 40 grid. We then calculated the ratio
of the actual findings with our estimation,
it showed that our approximation was generally an overestimation. In general, the actual number of grids checked was only 65%
of our estimate. Figure 12 shows the result
of running the algorithm on the top 40 grids.
This is ordered by the number of cells filled.
The graph includes grids filled from 15 to 28
cells in a 100 cell grid.
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5.5

Example Bounds on Filled
Grids

A Latin square that is filled more than 1/2
full can become fully solvable. We were able
to compute fillable squares given the state of
a Latin square. For example when the grids
#5601,#5939 and #4323 were combined, we
yielded a result of 57 unique cells in the Latin
square. By using an algorithm that checks
to see if a cell has only one possible value,
we were able to complete 96 cells in the grid.
This leaves 4 cells empty where there are two
different possible solutions.
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RESULTS

The results of our password cracking system
showed promise, as we were able to leak information from the OTG Latin square used
to generate website passwords. The results
of running a single DNP pair through the
password system was very quick. The time
for a single run ranged from 0-16 seconds
with the average taking 4.4 seconds.
The results of combining two different
top 40 smallest possible grids resulted in
grids that only had 4 possible grids, which
is essentially one grid that is rotated 4
times. The average number of grids that
had to be checked with 2 small grids was
143,801. The minimum number of grids
checked was 25,884 and the maximum number was 559,504. The grid that resulted
in the maximum number (Grids #8016 and
c 2019 ADFSL
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#8273) took only 11 seconds to run and it
resulted in 23 of the cells in the grid being
filled. We also had a combination of Grids
#11 and #4797 yielded 25 filled cells with
the number of grids checked at 66,880.
Comparing the results from the above
two tests to the computed number of Latin
squares shows a stark difference. For all
possible Latin squares of size 10 there are
≈ 9.9x1036 possible Latin squares. We were
able to compute 25% of the grid using only
6.6 ∗ 105 computations. Thus if there were
two more edge case grids that were optimally
combined, 50% of the grid could be filled.
This could possibly allow for a grid to be
solved in about 1.2 ∗ 106 computations. This
is 30 orders of magnitude less than the total
number of Latin squares of size 10.

7. CONCLUSIONS
AND FUTURE WORK
Our hypothesis was that given a set of Domain Name Password pairs, it would be possible to gain information about the original
grid. We have created a set of constraints,
based on the design documents provided by
the creator of the Off The Grid, that can
be used to reduce the state space of possible Latin squares. We have implemented
several algorithms that represent and attack
the different facets of the OTG system. We
have given evidence that it is possible to reduce the amount of work required to crack
the Latin squares used in the OTG password
system. We believe that given the calculations shown in Section 6 we can see that it
is possible that the use of Latin squares as
a password generation scheme can be compromised given a small set of passwords. We
have shown that character in a domain name
generates about 3 characters of the original
Latin square. If we extrapolate this out to
a full size 26x26 (676 cells) Latin square it
would take about 19 domain name password
Page 13
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pairs to fully crack an OTG system. (676 /
2 (fill 50% of grid) / 3 (3 characters per domain character) / 6 (6 character password)).

7.1

Security Considerations

Given the above evidence, we would not recommend using the OTG for generating passwords for websites. We have shown that
there are possible weaknesses in the system
that could allow the original grid to be recovered. In addition, there is not a method
that can be used to reset a single password if
the password is lost. The loss of passwords
occurs on a regular basis as security breaches
have increased considerably over the past
decade. Finally, OTG does not support multiple logins names for websites. There are
a variety of reasons for having multiple accounts and the OTG system has no mechanism for multiple logins. Additionally, standards like WebAuthn provide a much higher
level of security using asymmetric encryption.

7.2

Future Work

The first area we would like to pursue more
research, we would like to generate more
possible passwords to find more weak DNP
pairs. These weak DNP pairs can be used to
find a closer approximation to the theoretical bounds that can be used to attack the
OTG system.
The second area of future research is the
integration of the entire process into one
seamless tool. Currently there is a CUDA
C Program that implements the parallel
password cracking attacks. There are Bash
scripts that parse the output of the password
cracking and produce CSV outputs which
can then be parsed and read using Excel.
Those results are then manually sorted and
used to create the next stage of computation. Additionally, for the optimal computation, we utilize Python scripts to combine
the grids to get a quick handle on which
Page 14
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combinations will yield grids the largest portion of a grid to be filled, which is then
run through a Java program that finds constrained cells and fills them in. All of these
programs should be combined into 1 streamlined system to make the process seamless
and more efficient.
The third area of research is to expand the
size of the grids that we will do processing
on. Currently we used a size of grid where we
have an exact size on the number of possible
grids. We would like to expand the research
to attack grids of size 15, 20 and 26, where
26 is the ultimate goal of the research. This
may require additional hardware and modification of software. The password cracking
software is mostly written to accommodate
larger sizes of grids, but the generation of
an initial set of grids and the distribution
of those grids to blocks of cores depends on
the size of the input, the number of cores
on a GPU and the available RAM on those
GPU’s. This process would require some fine
tuning, but should be a straightforward task.
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The top 40 smallest Domain Name Password
Pairs are shown in Table 1. Tables 2 and 3
show the results of combining pairs of 2 DNP
pairs from Table 1 with each other. These
tables only show the pairs that have only
a single unique result grid (4 possible grids
with rotation).
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Table 1. Top 40 Smallest Domain Name
Password Pairs
Grid Number
503
5419
4797
8179
11873
2954
5129
645
16
1978
2606
9839
11357
9159
758
1749
5581
8997
11181
8788
4648
4773
2430
11
933
1373
1582
1734
3143
5421
6221
6674
7409
8276
8016
1620
8064
8273
9347
10969
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Number Filled
12
12
14
12
13
13
12
14
13
13
15
14
14
14
13
14
13
13
13
13
15
15
11
13
14
14
13
14
14
14
13
13
12
13
14
13
12
13
13
15

Valid
8
8
12
16
16
24
24
32
40
40
40
40
40
44
48
48
48
48
48
52
56
64
72
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
84
88
88
88
88
88

Table 2. Results combining Two Domain
Name Password pairs
Grids
503-5419
503-4797
503-8179
503-11873
503-2954
503-5129
503-11181
503-4648
503-933
503-1620
503-10969
5419-4797
5419-2954
5419-16
5419-1978
5419-758
5419-1620
4797-8179
4797-11873
4797-2954
4797-5129
4797-645
4797-16
4797-1978
4797-9839
4797-4648
4797-11
4797-933
4797-1734
4797-6674
4797-8064
4797-10969
8179-16
8179-1978
8179-9347
11873-2954
11873-11181
11873-1620
11873-10969
2954-5129
8064-10969

Filled
20
21
24
20
19
21
21
24
20
24
22
16
18
18
18
17
19
22
20
17
21
21
20
20
23
21
25
21
20
21
20
20
24
24
20
20
18
24
22
21
22

Total Possible
42248
27632
31432
44392
25884
30632
66920
64152
44324
62312
27232
29280
28260
121920
121920
46040
68880
51880
74680
46772
51560
46820
141440
141440
60128
85880
66880
57180
48604
79960
46820
47760
270920
270920
30756
30132
95704
88680
34200
44844
92512
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Valid
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
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Table 3. Results combining Two Domain
Name Password pairs Continued
Grids
2954-16
2954-1978
2954-9839
2954-4648
2954-11
2954-933
2954-8064
2954-10969
5129-16
5129-1978
5129-10969
645-10969
16-11181
16-4648
16-1734
16-1620
16-10969
1978-11181
1978-4648
1978-1734
1978-1620
1978-10969
2606-8276
9839-9159
9839-8273
9839-9347
9839-10969
9159-4648
9159-10969
758-1582
1749-1734
11181-11
11181-933
4648-1373
4648-8273
4648-9347
4773-11
2430-8273
2430-9347
3143-10969
8016-8273
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Filled
19
19
21
21
22
20
20
19
21
21
22
22
20
21
23
23
23
20
21
23
23
23
23
20
21
21
24
21
22
18
24
24
19
25
22
21
23
20
21
22
23

Total Possible
213124
213124
107892
103684
68724
50184
27356
28524
345440
345440
37200
37744
409008
362800
228624
396880
217840
409008
362800
228624
396880
217840
126640
230756
302316
183700
178636
182480
91520
184792
77912
179320
123260
450960
282200
252144
322288
160840
91424
112344
559504

Valid
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
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